Consider this statement: “Click here to win a million dollars instantly!”

Most of us immediately reject this as nonsense. At least we think we do.

Neuropsychological findings, though, indicate we believe such enticements—if only for a sliver of a moment—before dismissing them.

This insight, previously examined by several noted psychologists, undergirds new research, publications, and a novel theory by Erik Asp. A recent Ph.D. graduate in Iowa’s Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Neuroscience, Asp offers an explanation of how we believe or doubt new information, with real-world implications for protecting consumers from false advertising and other forms of unethical persuasion.

“In a very real sense, you initially believe all propositions and perceptions, some which are very weird,” says Asp. “Then you can come back a split second later and reject (or doubt) it.”

That is, you’re able to reject an idea only if your ventromedial prefrontal cortex is functioning properly. That is a central feature of Asp’s “False Tagging Theory,” which examines the functional mechanics of the prefrontal cortex and maps the neuroanatomy of belief.

Asp developed the theory with his mentor Daniel Tranel, professor of neurology and psychology and director of the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Neuroscience. Working with Tranel and other colleagues, Asp contends that the prefrontal cortex is essential for the sort of common sense skepticism and doubt that prevent us from making errors in daily life—lapses in judgment ranging from small, benign mistakes to serious financial decisions.

Beyond measuring susceptibility to persuasion, Asp’s research more broadly sheds light on a host of behaviors rooted in how the brain processes new information. Many of these insights come from studying patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex from a stroke or surgical removal of a tumor.

“We see overall that prefrontal patients are more credulous when confronted with new information,” says Asp. “The fact that doubt is an important function of the prefrontal cortex actually can explain many things that we’ve seen in prefrontal patients, like perseveration (compulsive repetition despite a clear pattern of negative feedback), confabulation (compulsive lying), and distractibility. This theory is an attempt to put it all together in one coherent package.”

Asp and Tranel’s “False Tagging Theory: Toward a Unitary Account of Prefrontal Cortex Function” comprises a chapter in the upcoming second edition of “Principles of Frontal Lobe Function,” published by Oxford University Press.

Mechanics of belief and doubt

Based on their research, Asp and Tranel reject two seemingly opposing hypotheses about the anatomy and function of the prefrontal cortex: 1) the prefrontal cortex functions are contained in specialized regions of the prefrontal cortex, or 2) prefrontal cortex function is homogenous, i.e., all functions occur across all its regions. Instead, they’ve found evidence for a theory that combines aspects of both previously-held theories. They suggest that “the initial processing for different modalities is done in distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex,” with other prefrontal regions enlisted when a particular mental task is more demanding.

Asp and Tranel proceed to investigate the psychological phenomenon of doubt—the “singular computation the prefrontal cortex could perform that might encapsulate the diverse mental processes [that are often] attributed to it.”

Drawing on generations of inquiry into what belief is, how it happens, and what it does, Asp construes belief as the mental representation and assessment of information. That information might be a thought or something experienced through the senses. “A cognition or perception is believed when the information is represented in a mental system and when that representation disposes an individual to act as if it were true, given appropriate circumstances,” Asp writes.

Belief is the mind’s initial default mode of mentally representing a thought or idea. Assessment comes later—a process to determine the truth or falsity of an idea through skepticism, doubt, and reassessment. Once those determinations have been made, the brain—to function practically and efficiently—requires a shorthand “tag” of false value, so as not to reassess every thought or impression from zero each time it arises.

Asp and Tranel say the healthy, fully developed prefrontal cortex applies a false tag to patently dubious claims and functions as the brain’s skeptic. Problems with the prefrontal cortex disrupt this false tagging mechanism.

Believing what you read

In a recent paper, Asp, Tranel, Kenneth Manzel, and other colleagues report further evidence supporting the False Tagging Theory. Measuring the effect of prefrontal function on financial or consumer decision-making, patients with prefrontal damage were compared to study participants with brain damage outside the prefrontal cortex, and to participants with no brain damage.

Asp and his colleagues studied 39 people with adult-onset lesions, or damage in specific regions of the brain, from the world-renowned Iowa Neurological Patient Registry, founded in 1982.

Working with Tranel, Asp drew on the registry to test his hypothesis that patients with damage to the frontal lobe of their brains are more gullible. Participants were given a selection of advertisements based on actual advertisements ruled misleading by the Federal Trade Commission. The results, published in “Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience,” indicate that individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex displayed a “doubt deficit” and were more inclined to believe misleading advertisements.

This held true even when the misleading ads featured a disclaimer clearly revealing their falsity. Asp and his co-authors conclude this tendency could help explain why people with prefrontal dysfunction make poor financial decisions when exposed to manipulative information that sets off alarm bells, or at least caution bells, in most people.

“In any given situation with elements of ambiguity,” Asp says, “there should be a bell curve of doubt that most people feel toward the situation. Some will feel less, some will feel more, but most will fall in the middle with an average amount of doubt.”

His research suggests that prefrontal patients will always feel less doubt than average in each situation. He says these findings have ethical and public policy implications, since children and the elderly have diminished prefrontal cortex function and are more inclined to accept propositions uncritically. This leaves them vulnerable and easily victimized by unscrupulous persuaders.

Asp says the false tagging mechanism, as a model of complex neural interactions, still requires refinement and elaboration, and there are many questions yet to consider. But he says the False Tagging Theory may account for a number of symptoms commonly observed in people with a diminished prefrontal cortex.

Asp and Tranel’s “False Tagging Theory: Toward a Unitary Account of Prefrontal Cortex Function,” a chapter in “Principles of Frontal Lobe Function,” will be published by Oxford University Press Nov. 2012.

The 2012 published study on false advertising, “A neuropsychological test of belief and doubt: Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases credulity for misleading advertising,” was co-authored by Asp, Tranel, and Manzel, with contributing authors Brian Koestner, Catherine A. Cole, and Natalie L. Denburg.

Asp, Tranel, and the UI’s Kanchna Ramchandran examined False Tagging Theory further in “Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and the human prefrontal cortex” in Neuropsychology, July 2012.